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ABSTRACT 
The majority of the research literature on early antitrust law focuses on prices and output, but 
few empirical studies decompose these symptoms into the causes that the underlying theory 
suggests. The literature has been equally silent about secondary effects, even when their 
derivative claims dependent on and could be proven (or disproven by) evidence in such data. This 
paper focuses on three case studies where the United States Supreme Court used the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to justify significant government intervention in an industry, resulting in the breakup 
of a major trust or cartel—Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States, and United States v. American Tobacco Co.—by measuring five 
industry metrics and their relation to the antitrust action: capital, number of establishments, 
employment, profit margin, and revenue. 
I owe many thanks to Daniel M.G. Raff for serving as my primary advisor despite his own hectic 
schedule and for teaching me everything I know about business history and research in general; 
Martin Asher for teaching me everything I know about antitrust, introducing me to Dr. Raff, and 
organizing the Wharton Research Scholars program; Frank Diebold for teaching me everything I 
know about econometrics; Jamshed Ghandhi for steering me toward the case study format and 
encouraging me to dig deeper than the usual price/output analysis; and Adrian Tschoegl for 
spending great time and effort brainstorming, editing, and finding relevant literature. The 
research conducted here is all my own work, and so all errors and shortcomings rest with me. 
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“The modern corporation,” wrote antitrust economist George Bittlingmayer, “constitutes the 
single most important innovation in the organization of business. The modern corporate form is 
responsible in large part for the phenomenal increase in the standard of living of the last century. 
By means of limited liability, the corporation can raise large amounts of capital. By means of the 
holding company and merger, it solves problems of coordination and control, and allows valuable 
assets in the form of a going concern to be transferred to more valuable uses. We tend naturally to 
view our improved conditions as the result of a long list of specific technical advances—the 
automobile, the airplane, electrical appliances, or the computer. But we owe our well-being to 
organizational as well as physical innovation.” (Sklar 1988) 
This author seconds Bittlingmayer‟s call to expand our understanding of posterity to include 
the modern corporation; in such a critical revision, antitrust must play a significant role. “The 
trust question was the corporation question,” explains historian Martin Sklar (1988). “The great 
antitrust debates were…in essence, debates about the role and power of the large corporations in 
the market and in society at large, and debates about the corresponding role and power of 
government in relation to the emergent corporate order.” These debates continue today but all too 
often without an appreciation for their predecessors. This paper will dig deeper into the antitrust 
questions that loomed at the outset of this type of law by exploring effects that have heretofore 
been ignored by scholars—and in so doing hopefully shed a wider light on the making and 
influence of the modern corporation. 
The majority of the research literature on early antitrust law focuses on prices and output, but 
few empirical studies decompose these symptoms into the causes that the underlying theory 
suggests. The literature has been equally silent about secondary effects, even when their 
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derivative claims dependent on and could be proven (or disproven by) evidence in such data.
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This paper will focus on three case studies where the United States Supreme Court used the 
Sherman Antitrust Act to justify significant government intervention in an industry, resulting in 
the breakup of a major trust or cartel. Part I will give a brief history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
including the major Supreme Court cases that enforced it. Part II will discuss three papers 
published in peer-reviewed journals that have criticized the Sherman Antitrust Act or antitrust 
legislation similar to it; counterarguments will be offered that will serve as hypotheses for the 
analyses of the three case studies. Parts III, IV, and V will explore the three cases studies—
Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 
and United States v. American Tobacco Co., respectively—by measuring five industry metrics 
and their relation to the antitrust action. Part VI will conclude with similar findings, caveats based 
on ambiguities, and implications for modern antitrust and historical understanding of the modern 
corporation. 
 
I. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,” Adam 
Smith famously wrote, “but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.” The American public of the late nineteenth century believed as much 
too. At the outset of the Gilded Age, “antitrust” was not even part of the legal system or the 
common lexicon. The base word “trust,” as a legal notion, was known only to legal scholars as a 
personal device of wealthy citizens. One person would “entrust” his possessions to another. In 
                                                     
1
 The Shughart and Tollison (1991) paper mentioned in Part II is a good example of this phenomenon, where the 
authors made assertions about employment without considering the effects on employment in the immediate 
industries in question. If antitrust actions did not affect employment in those very industries in which legal action was 
taken, it is difficult to argue that a broad regression on national employment is significant and not simply the natural 
outcome of a dataset with too many exogenous variables. 
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1879, Henry M. Flager, John Rockefeller‟s right-hand man, adapted the trust form to Standard Oil 
of Ohio. Three years later, Flager and a lawyer named Samuel C.T. Dodd “drafted a new Standard 
Oil trust agreement that set up separate corporations in each state with major properties belonging 
to Standard Oil.” (Gordon 2008) The result was a de facto monopoly and, unsurprisingly, populist 
backlash. 
States took action against trusts before the federal government. Boudreaux, et al. (1995) show 
that the Sherman Act was based on a Missouri antitrust law that was itself the result of lobbying 
by cattlemen and butchers trying to “thwart competition from the newly centralized meat-
processing facilities in Chicago.” They succeeded. Senator John Sherman, a Republican from 
Ohio, faced strong pressure to bring the federal government into the mix, probably in large part 
because his constituents lived in a state housing the first and most dominant trust. Two pieces of 
evidence indicate the level of public outrage at these trusts. First, when Sherman introduced the 
antitrust act that bore his name, his speech on the Senate floor is particularly inflammatory, 
conjuring images of the few times in the nation‟s history when its citizens felt genuine fear. 
Second, the floor votes suggest a legislator would need a high degree of bravery to put his name 
on record against the bill. It passed the Senate on April 8, 1890, with 51 yea votes and 1 nay vote, 
and it passed the House of Representatives on June 20, 1890, unanimously (242-0). The text was 
brief and, as a result, rather vague. The main clause declared, “Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
Initially, the courts struggled to interpret this law and were indeed resistant to interrupt 
economic activity based on ambiguous and untested statute of questionable constitutionality. “It 
was not until 1897,” according to Sklar, “that the Supreme Court first construed the Sherman Act 
5 
 
as recognizing no distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade. The Court 
declared both types of restraint illegal, and thereby construed the Sherman Act as reversing or 
superseding the common law with respect to restraints of trade and monopoly, not only 
procedurally but substantively as well.” Sklar is referring to United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Association, where the Court first acted against cartel behavior. For the preceding seven 
years, the Sherman Act had gone unenforced as the Court found reasons that it did not apply to 
case after case, culminating in the famous United States v. E.C. Knight Company in 1895 that 
“sustained the „Sugar Trust.‟” After Trans-Missouri, the Court took several major actions against 
trusts, including United States v. Joint Traffic Association in 1898 and Northern Securities Co. v. 
United States. These three cases all involved railroad companies and have been thoroughly 
addressed in Binder (1988) and so will go unexplored in this paper. Other major cases avoided by 
this analysis because the necessary data was either unavailable or fragmented are Montague & 
Company v. Lowry (1904), Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), and Shawnee Compress Company v. 
Anderson (1908). 
The Sherman Antitrust Act would eventually come under fire for its generality and its 
inapplicability to mergers. In fact, Bittlingmayer (1985) argues compellingly that the success of 
the Sherman Act in warding off trusts encouraged companies to turn to the merger form instead, 
generating the famous Merger Wave at the turn of the century. The former criticism was voiced in 
scholarship as early as 1909, “The fact is that the reason why the Sherman Act has not been 
efficiently enforces is because it is an unenforceable statute. It is as useless to attempt to enforce it 
generally and uniformly, according to its plain provisions, as it would be to attempt to enforce a 
statute regulating the price of commodities or the intrinsic value of money. The Act is an attempt 
to control commercial and economic forces by statute, and like all similar Acts, must ultimately 
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either fall into entire disuse, or be repealed, after having caused, as such statutes always do, more 
or less injury to the community. The remedy for the evils of the Act is not in providing cumbrous, 
mischievous and unworkable methods for avoiding some of them, but by substituting for it, so far 
as the public welfare requires, a properly framed, guarded and workable Act, with proper 
provisions for its efficient and uniform enforcement.” (Benton 1909) The Clayton Antitrust Act of 
1914 would address many of these concerns—but not before the courts used the Sherman Act to 
its full potential. Looking back on one particular application, legal scholar Felix H. Levy wrote, 
“[T]he Sherman Law has been given a most comprehensive and drastic interpretation by the 
Federal courts, so that practically all agreements among competitors whereby competition among 
them is substantially reduced, are declared unlawful, without respect to the fact that such 
agreements may be based upon good motives and upon beneficial economic results.” 
 
II. Criticism in the Research Literature 
Of course, flaws in the Sherman Act do not prove it had a net negative impact on the economy 
and society. The question, then, is whether its positive effects outweigh its drawbacks. Several 
scholars draw a strong “no” conclusion. A substantial portion of the remaining paper will address 
and test their concerns. 
Delorme, et al. (1997) compared price and output levels in various large manufacturing 
industries in 1880-1890 versus 1891-1900. They concluded that “following the Sherman Act, 
only one trust (salt) was certainly acting competitively, lowering relative prices. Three other trust 
industries (copper, petroleum, and sugar) were acting less competitively by raising relative prices. 
These results suggest that the Sherman Act, once enacted, was ineffective or was unenforced in 
dealing with the trusts.” [emphasis added] The theory behind this study rests upon a basic 
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microeconomic foundation. Monopolies can charge a price where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost, but because of the lack of competitive pressure, that price is high enough that they 
earn economic profits. By charging a higher price, they are depriving the consumer of some of the 
consumer surplus from the lower price that they would pay under perfect competition. Because 
price is necessarily a function of quantity, this higher price implies that the monopoly is 
restricting output. Therefore, Delorme, et al. argue, if the Sherman Act was necessary, prices 
should be too high and output too low in several major industries prior to 1890. Once antitrust 
was on the books, though, these firms should have cleaned up their act to avoid government 
intervention to break them up by force; in other words, we should see prices fall and output 
increase after 1890. 
This paper contends the above analysis is superficial and misdirected. Antitrust laws are only 
effective insofar as they are enforced by the courts, and as seen in Part I, meaningful judicial 
precedent related to the Sherman Act did not accumulate until after the period considered by the 
authors. In fact, the court decision in E.C. Knight specifically “sustained the „Sugar Trust,‟” 
which was one of the industries considered by Delorme, et al. Furthermore, the petroleum 
industry, which will be addressed in Part IV, did not experience antitrust action until 1911—after 
the period measured by Delorme, et al.—though their findings actually give support for the 
antitrust action taken in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States because they found the 
petroleum industry “acting less competitively” in the time leading up to the Supreme Court case. 
Shughart and Tollison (1991) studied antitrust actions taken by the Justice Department during 
1947-1981. Their regression revealed that a 1% increase in antitrust cases was correlated with a 
0.17% increase in the national unemployment rate. They concluded that causation must exist in 
the form of an “antitrust Phillips curve.” Shughart and Tollison rely on a public choice 
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perspective for the theoretical explanation behind their empirical interpretation. Government 
intervention has several oft-overlooked side effects. First, the cartels may actually be efficient, as 
explained below. If they are more efficient than perfect competition, then antitrust action will 
raise the industry‟s costs, resulting in lower employment. Second, government intervention 
usually inflicts uncertainty on an industry. Because investors do not know whether the 
intervention will change the industry against their interests, they charge a higher risk premium 
and often shift their capital to another industry entirely. The result is slower growth and smaller 
companies, which in turn means lower employment. Third, antitrust action requires major 
government resources, which must come from tax revenues (either now or in the future). 
Increased antitrust implies increased taxes, which reduces economic activity and thus 
employment. 
This paper should not need to point out that correlation does not prove causation, but alas, it 
seems to have been forgotten here. It is equally possible, for instance, that an increase in 
unemployment put more pressure on the Justice Department to crack down on monopolistic 
behavior. The above authors also neglect private antitrust cases, which Posner (1970) famously 
showed to be an order of magnitude greater than Justice cases; if private cases tell a different 
story, then one may more reasonably conclude an opposite direction of causation from the one 
they suggest. Regardless, it is impossible to isolate any one cause of unemployment, though 
antitrust actions can increase employment by multiplying firms in the industry. 
Bittlingmayer (1985) argues that cartels may increase efficiency in industries with high fixed 
costs and low variable costs. “May” is the operative word. This paper does not dispute 
Bittlingmayer‟s general claim, but it does intend to use empirical evidence (in the form of total 
industry capital and number of establishments) to demonstrate that industry-level efficiency was 
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unharmed by antitrust actions, as it would logically be if the cartels in question were responsible 
for decreased efficiency. The analyses in Parts III, IV, and V will also test the claim made by 
Shughart and Tollison by measuring industry-level employment and the argument in Delorme, et 
al., by deconstructing price and output into revenue and profit margin. 
 
III. Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. was established by a contract binding several coal (or 
“coke”) producers in cooperative behavior. “Ohio Coal Trust Sued,” headlined The New York 
Times on April 6, 1899. “The Government Charges Sixteen Producers with Violation of the Anti-
Trust Act of 1890.” The article explained: 
It is alleged in the bill that the defendants on Dec. 15, 1897, entered into a contract and 
combination in the form of a trust and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce in 
regard to the sale and production of coal and coke, and in violation of law this agreement, 
it is said, went into effect about Jan. 1, 1898, and since that time they have monopolized 
and controlled the amount of coal and coke produced in the Kanawha district, and only 
permitted such amount of coal mined and coke made by the several defendants as could be 
sold by the Chesapeake and Ohio Fuel Company, and that the defendants were only 
permitted to ship their proportionate amount of coal at a stipulated price and figured upon 
the ratio designated in the contract, as fixed by the Executive Committee. By this action it 
is alleged that competition in the sale of the same has been wholly destroyed. 
 
A few years later, “The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati…upheld the lower federal 
court‟s decision against the company.” In 1902, the Supreme Court concurred that “Congress has 
seen fit to prohibit all contracts in restraint of trade. It was not left to the courts the consideration 
of the question whether such restraint is reasonable or unreasonable…” 
The following graphs and regressions analyze the effect of this antitrust action on the five 
variables in question: capital, number of establishments, employment, profit margin, and 
revenue.
2
 The regressions measure the dependent variable as a function of an intercept, a time 
                                                     
2
 Profit margin is calculated by dividing “product value” (which is a proxy for revenue) by “value added by 
manufacture” (which is a proxy for revenue minus cost of goods sold). 
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trend, gross domestic product, and a dummy variable that is “0” before the antitrust action and 
“1” afterward. The dependent variable has 9 observations, associated with 1860, 1870, 1880, 
1890, 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, and 1920, all taken from the 1920 Census of Manufactures; this 
means the regressions all have 7 degrees of freedom. With so few degrees of freedom, we will 
make only general, tentative claims based on this data. 
Exhibit 1. Coke Industry, Capital, Graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2. Coke Industry, Capital, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -15287.12 38865.61 -0.393 0.710 
TIME -16880.87 18033.26 -0.936 0.392 
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GDP 5245.65 1219.31 4.302 0.007 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1902 11329.61 62475.63 0.181 0.863 
     
     R-squared 0.8833    Mean dependent var 75852.56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8133    S.D. dependent var 119892.9 
S.E. of regression 51804.37    Akaike info criterion 24.849 
Sum squared resid 1.34E+10    Schwarz criterion 24.937 
Log likelihood -107.822    Hannan-Quinn criter. 24.660 
F-statistic 12.616    Durbin-Watson stat 2.744 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient—which is typically the 
maximum likelihood estimate if the antitrust action did have a marginal effect—is strongly 
positive. We cannot, of course, conclude that the antitrust action increased the coke industry‟s 
total capital, but we can conclude that it did not decrease its capital, indicating it did not hinder 
the industry‟s growth or efficiency. 
Exhibit 3: Coke Industry, Number of Establishments, Graph 
 
Exhibit 4: Coke Industry, Number of Establishments, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 12.827 34.069 0.376 0.722 
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TIME 64.017 15.807 4.050 0.010 
GDP -1.260 1.0688 -1.179 0.292 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1902 -13.800 54.765 -0.252 0.811 
     
     R-squared 0.892    Mean dependent var 192.556 
Adjusted R-squared 0.828    S.D. dependent var 109.546 
S.E. of regression 45.410    Akaike info criterion 10.770 
Sum squared resid 10310.50    Schwarz criterion 10.858 
Log likelihood -44.467    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.581 
F-statistic 13.852    Durbin-Watson stat 2.5203 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0074    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but in this case, the coefficient is negative. 
We cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action decreased the number of establishments, 
but we can conclude that it did not increase the number of establishments, as one might expect if 
the antitrust action increased competition significantly. 
Exhibit 5: Coke Industry, Employment, Graph 
 
Exhibit 6: Coke Industry, Employment, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2372.912 3067.540 -0.774 0.474 
13 
 
TIME 3933.258 1423.309 2.763 0.040 
GDP 41.158 96.236 0.428 0.687 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1902 4445.509 4931.004 0.902 0.409 
     
     R-squared 0.922    Mean dependent var 14282.56 
Adjusted R-squared 0.875    S.D. dependent var 11546.00 
S.E. of regression 4088.755    Akaike info criterion 19.771 
Sum squared resid 83589587    Schwarz criterion 19.859 
Log likelihood -84.969    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.582 
F-statistic 19.598    Durbin-Watson stat 2.961 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but it has a strongly positive coefficient.
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We cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action increased employment, but we can 
conclude, contra Shughart and Tollison (1991), that it did not decrease employment in the coke 
industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 7: Coke Industry, Profit Margin, Graph 
                                                     
3
 When I use the modifier “strongly” throughout the paper to qualify the direction of the coefficient, I am simply 
referring to its size relative to the other coefficients in the regression; it is not meant to be any comment on the 
statistical significance, which I will repeatedly show to be insignificant at any reasonable level (5% or 10%). 
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Exhibit 8: Coke Industry, Profit Margin, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.555 0.056 9.961 0.000 
TIME -0.051 0.026 -1.965 0.107 
GDP 0.000 0.002 -0.106 0.920 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1902 0.057 0.090 0.639 0.551 
     
     R-squared 0.685    Mean dependent var 0.401 
Adjusted R-squared 0.496    S.D. dependent var 0.105 
S.E. of regression 0.074    Akaike info criterion -2.060 
Sum squared resid 0.028    Schwarz criterion -1.972 
Log likelihood 13.268    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.249 
F-statistic 3.619    Durbin-Watson stat 2.384 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.100    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is positive. We cannot 
therefore conclude that the antitrust action increased profit margins, but we can conclude that it 
did not decrease profit margins, suggesting any effect on prices must have occurred through 
output. 
Exhibit 9: Coke Industry, Revenue, Graph 
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Exhibit 10: Coke Industry, Revenue, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -22864251 6813330. -3.355 0.020 
TIME -8598857. 3161319. -2.720 0.042 
GDP 4452225. 213751.3 20.829 0.000 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1902 -1889251. 10952281 -0.172 0.870 
     
     R-squared 0.995    Mean dependent var 69109049 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992    S.D. dependent var 1.00E+08 
S.E. of regression 9081557.    Akaike info criterion 35.182 
Sum squared resid 4.12E+14    Schwarz criterion 35.270 
Log likelihood -154.321    Hannan-Quinn criter. 34.993 
F-statistic 323.506    Durbin-Watson stat 3.064 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is strongly negative. We 
cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action decreased revenue in the coke industry, but we 
can conclude that it did not increase revenue in the coke industry. This conclusion has ambiguous 
implications for industry growth and efficiency. 
IV. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States 
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As mentioned earlier, Standard Oil‟s trust consisted of a de facto monopoly in the petroleum 
industry. John D. Rockefeller founded the company in 1870; in less than thirty years, he had 
captured 90 percent market share in the petroleum industry. Standard employed four tactics in 
eating up the American petroleum market: the “trust” form, acquisitions on favorable terms, 
localized predatory pricing, and most potent, cartelization of the transportation of petroleum. 
The trust form existed in common law well before Standard adopted it, but in the past, it had 
been exclusively used between individuals, not firms. It simply allowed one individual to entrust 
his assets to another individual. In 1879, Henry M. Flager, John Rockefeller‟s right-hand man, 
adapted the trust form to Standard Oil of Ohio. Three years later, Flager and a lawyer named 
Samuel C.T. Dodd “drafted a new Standard Oil trust agreement that set up separate corporations 
in each state with major properties belonging to Standard Oil.” (Gordon 2008) With this new 
arrangement, Standard could gobble up smaller competitors by entrusting their assets to Standard 
Oil of Ohio. Throughout the 1890s and 1900s, “Mergers continued to be Standard‟s tool of choice 
for growth.” (Manns 1998) 
Part of Standard‟s ability to overpower competitors and coerce them into mergers stemmed 
from its ability to lower its prices in specific geographies to undercut those competitors until they 
submitted, but that causation does not explain from where Standard derived this pricing 
advantage. “Standard enforced the transportation cartel,” explain Granitz and Klein (1996), “by 
shifting its refinery shipments among railroads to stabilize individual railroad market shares at 
collusively agreed-on levels. This method of cartel policing was effective because Standard 
possessed a dominant share of refining, a dominance made possible with the assistance of the 
railroads. The railroads facilitated Standard's refinery acquisitions and prevented new refiner 
entry by charging disadvantageously high rates to non-Standard refiners.” 
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The Supreme Court decided that Standard Oil violated the Sherman Act and ordered it broken 
up into several smaller companies. The following graphs and regressions follow the same 
methodology used in Part III. 
Exhibit 11. Petroleum Industry, Capital, Graph 
 
Exhibit 12. Petroleum Industry, Capital, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -47576.13 28178.79 -1.688 0.152 
TIME -61123.08 11191.21 -5.462 0.003 
GDP 17084.79 1163.18 14.688 0.000 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 61257.37 52072.51 1.176 0.292 
     
     R-squared 0.993    Mean dependent var 225314.3 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989    S.D. dependent var 368510.6 
S.E. of regression 39402.21    Akaike info criterion 24.302 
Sum squared resid 7.76E+09    Schwarz criterion 24.390 
Log likelihood -105.360    Hannan-Quinn criter. 24.113 
F-statistic 231.587    Durbin-Watson stat 1.090 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
     
     
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient is strongly positive. We 
cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action increased the total capital in the petroleum 
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industry, but we can conclude that it did not decrease capital, suggesting it did not impede growth 
or efficiency. 
Exhibit 13: Petroleum Industry, Number of Establishments, Graph 
 
Exhibit 14: Petroleum Industry, Number of Establishments, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 102.019 26.941 3.787 0.013 
TIME -17.926 10.699 -1.675 0.155 
GDP 3.185 1.112 2.864 0.035 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 46.659 49.784 0.937 0.392 
     
     R-squared 0.857    Mean dependent var 138.222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772    S.D. dependent var 78.887 
S.E. of regression 37.671    Akaike info criterion 10.397 
Sum squared resid 7095.431    Schwarz criterion 10.484 
Log likelihood -42.785    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.208 
F-statistic 10.028    Durbin-Watson stat 2.498 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.015    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient is strongly positive. We 
cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action increased the number of establishments in the 
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petroleum industry, but we can conclude that it did not decrease establishments, indicating it had 
no negative effect on competition (and as a result, reducing the odds that the trust was efficient). 
Exhibit 15: Petroleum Industry, Employment, Graph 
 
Exhibit 16: Petroleum Industry, Employment, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 370.903 2560.470 0.144857 0.891 
TIME -625.813 1016.891 -0.615418 0.565 
GDP 640.585 105.6929 6.060814 0.002 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 4645.845 4731.577 0.981881 0.371 
     
     R-squared 0.973    Mean dependent var 16863.11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.957    S.D. dependent var 17353.77 
S.E. of regression 3580.287    Akaike info criterion 19.505 
Sum squared resid 64092284    Schwarz criterion 19.593 
Log likelihood -83.774    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.316 
F-statistic 60.983    Durbin-Watson stat 1.595 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
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The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient is strongly positive. We 
cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action increased employment in the petroleum 
industry, but we can conclude that it did not decrease employment. 
Exhibit 17: Petroleum Industry, Profit Margin, Graph 
 
Exhibit 18: Petroleum Industry, Profit Margin, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.370 0.066 5.574 0.003 
TIME -0.063 0.026 -2.374 0.064 
GDP 0.002 0.003 0.874 0.422 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 0.045 0.123 0.368 0.728 
     
     R-squared 0.565    Mean dependent var 0.230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305    S.D. dependent var 0.111 
S.E. of regression 0.093    Akaike info criterion -1.615 
Sum squared resid 0.043    Schwarz criterion -1.528 
Log likelihood 11.269    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.804 
F-statistic 2.168    Durbin-Watson stat 1.820 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.210    
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The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient is positive, again 
suggesting no beneficial effect on profit margins. 
Exhibit 19: Petroleum Industry, Revenue, Graph 
 
Exhibit 20: Petroleum Industry, Revenue, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.93E+08 5.31E+08 -0.739 0.493 
TIME -1.23E+09 2.11E+08 -5.837 0.002 
GDP 2.28E+08 21937574 10.40 0.000 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 -1.01E+09 9.82E+08 -1.029 0.351 
     
     R-squared 0.977    Mean dependent var 1.41E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962    S.D. dependent var 3.83E+09 
S.E. of regression 7.43E+08    Akaike info criterion 43.992 
Sum squared resid 2.76E+18    Schwarz criterion 44.079 
Log likelihood -193.963    Hannan-Quinn criter. 43.803 
F-statistic 69.311    Durbin-Watson stat 1.037 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
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The antitrust dummy is statistically significant, but the coefficient is negative. We cannot 
therefore conclude that the antitrust action decreased revenue, but we can conclude that it did not 
increase revenue, suggesting little, if any, beneficial effect on growth and efficiency. 
 
V. United States v. American Tobacco Co. 
Like Standard Oil, the Supreme Court decided that American Tobacco was an illegal 
monopoly and ordered it divided into smaller firms. From its creation in 1890 to its breakup in 
1911, American Tobacco acquired over 200 competitors, most notably the Lucky Strike 
Company. By 1896, it had become so large that it was named one of the twelve original members 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. (Porter 1969) Similar to Chesapeake, the Supreme Court 
decided that the broad prohibitions of the Sherman Act barred the sheer size of American 
Tobacco, let alone any restrictive practices in which it may have engaged:
4
 
The public policy manifested by the Anti-Trust Act is expressed in such general language 
that it embraces every conceivable act which can possibly come within the spirit of its 
prohibitions, and that policy cannot be frustrated by resort to disguise or subterfuge of 
any kind. The record in this case discloses a combination on the part of the defendants 
with the purpose of acquiring dominion and control of interstate commerce in tobacco by 
methods and manners clearly within the prohibition of the Anti-Trust Act, and the subject 
matters of the combination and the combination itself are not excluded from the scope of 
the act as being matters of intrastate commerce and subject to state control. In this case 
the combination in all its aspects, both as to stock ownership and as to the corporations 
independently, including foreign corporations to the extent that they became cooperators 
in the combination, come within the prohibition of the first and second sections of the 
Anti-Trust Act. 
 
Again, the graphs and regressions follow the same methodology used in Part III. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4
 This interpretation was narrowed by subsequent antitrust legislation. 
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Exhibit 21. Tobacco Industry, Capital, Graph 
 
Exhibit 22. Tobacco Industry, Capital, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -17039.86 30077.15 -0.567 0.596 
TIME 18770.81 11945.14 1.571 0.177 
GDP 1338.44 1241.55 1.078 0.330 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 -15799.37 55580.56 -0.284 0.788 
     
     R-squared 0.792    Mean dependent var 80909.89 
Adjusted R-squared 0.666    S.D. dependent var 72823.70 
S.E. of regression 42056.68    Akaike info criterion 24.433 
Sum squared resid 8.84E+09    Schwarz criterion 24.520 
Log likelihood -105.946    Hannan-Quinn criter. 24.243 
F-statistic 6.329    Durbin-Watson stat 2.406 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.037    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is strongly negative. We 
cannot therefore conclude that the antitrust action decreased total capital in the tobacco industry, 
but we can conclude that it did not increase capital. Its effect on growth and efficiency is thus 
ambiguous. 
24 
 
Exhibit 23: Tobacco Industry, Number of Establishments, Graph 
 
Exhibit 24: Tobacco Industry, Number of Establishments, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 589.5268 38.59455 15.27487 0.0000 
TIME -34.50851 15.32782 -2.251364 0.0742 
GDP -0.438338 1.593133 -0.275142 0.7942 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 37.25351 71.32013 0.522342 0.6237 
     
     R-squared 0.736536    Mean dependent var 466.8889 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578457    S.D. dependent var 83.11956 
S.E. of regression 53.96649    Akaike info criterion 11.11571 
Sum squared resid 14561.91    Schwarz criterion 11.20336 
Log likelihood -46.02068    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.92655 
F-statistic 4.659300    Durbin-Watson stat 1.195161 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.065359    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is strongly positive. We 
cannot therefore conclude that antitrust action increase the number of establishments in the 
tobacco industry, but we can conclude that it did not decrease establishments, indicating it was 
not harmful to competition. 
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Exhibit 25: Tobacco Industry, Employment, Graph 
 
Exhibit 26: Tobacco Industry, Employment, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 23039.84 3022.925 7.622 0.001 
TIME 2510.49 1200.555 2.091 0.091 
GDP -221.33 124.783 -1.774 0.136 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 -1257.38 5586.163 -0.225 0.831 
     
     R-squared 0.551    Mean dependent var 25321.22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.282    S.D. dependent var 4987.165 
S.E. of regression 4226.936    Akaike info criterion 19.837 
Sum squared resid 89334922    Schwarz criterion 19.9251 
Log likelihood -85.269    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.648 
F-statistic 2.0455    Durbin-Watson stat 1.579 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.226    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is strongly negative. We 
cannot therefore conclude that antitrust action decreased employment in the tobacco industry, but 
we can conclude that it did not increase employment. Its effect on employment, regarding the 
claims of Shughart and Tollison (1991), is thus ambiguous. 
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Exhibit 27: Tobacco Industry, Profit Margin, Graph 
 
Exhibit 28: Tobacco Industry, Profit Margin, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.383 0.059 6.537 0.001 
TIME 0.063 0.023 2.699 0.043 
GDP -0.003 0.002 -1.223 0.276 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 -0.046 0.108 -0.426 0.688 
     
     R-squared 0.607    Mean dependent var 0.507 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371    S.D. dependent var 0.103 
S.E. of regression 0.0819    Akaike info criterion -1.866 
Sum squared resid 0.0335    Schwarz criterion -1.778 
Log likelihood 12.398    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.055 
F-statistic 2.572    Durbin-Watson stat 2.071 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.167    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is negative. We cannot 
therefore conclude that antitrust action decreased profit margins, but we can conclude that it did 
not increase profit margins. Its effect on prices via profit margins was thus not harmful and 
possibly beneficial. 
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Exhibit 29: Tobacco Industry, Revenue, Graph 
 
Exhibit 30: Tobacco Industry, Revenue, Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 8998241 8435006 1.067 0.335 
TIME 17696227 3349962 5.283 0.003 
GDP 1229252 348186 3.530 0.017 
ANTITRUST_DUMMY_1911 18405365 15587325 1.181 0.291 
     
     R-squared 0.983    Mean dependent var 1.08E+08 
Adjusted R-squared 0.973    S.D. dependent var 71856650 
S.E. of regression 11795    Akaike info criterion 35.705 
Sum squared resid 6.96E+14    Schwarz criterion 35.793 
Log likelihood -156.674    Hannan-Quinn criter. 35.516 
F-statistic 97.311    Durbin-Watson stat 1.865 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000    
     
     
 
The antitrust dummy is statistically insignificant, but its coefficient is strongly positive. We 
cannot therefore conclude that antitrust action increased revenue in the tobacco industry, but we 
can conclude that it did not decrease revenue, suggesting a beneficial effect on efficiency. 
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VI. Conclusions and Implications 
Before comparing findings across cases, a few caveats must be stated. None of the antitrust 
dummies were statistically significant, so these conclusions are phrased so as to indicate that the 
regressions do not prove correlation (or causation)—though they do discredit some claims made 
by other authors, as indicated in Part II. The R-squared variables are very high, suggesting the 
models explain most of the data, though the high selection criteria indicate its ability to predict 
out-of-sample data may be poor; the corollary is that other exogenous independent variables do in 
fact affect these dependent variables, but the models in question are comparable and sufficient to 
draw some temperate conclusions. The Durbin-Watson statistics are mostly close to 2, so 
cyclicality and serial correlation are not causes for concerns. The F-statistics also confirm that the 
full model is statistically significant, which brings us to the final statistical point: Despite having 
low t-statistics, the coefficients are the result of a least-squares estimate and therefore represent 
the maximum likelihood estimate of each variable‟s respective contribution to the dependent 
variable in question. This paper will use these coefficients as such, not to construe them as proof 
of correlation (as indicated above) but rather to suggest the probable direction of correlation or 
lack thereof. 
In two of the three cases, the antitrust coefficient for capital was positive, so we can conclude 
that antitrust action more often did not decrease capital, suggesting on balance it did not impede 
growth or efficiency. In two of the three cases, the antitrust coefficient for the number of 
establishments was positive, so we can conclude the antitrust action more often did not decrease 
establishments, suggesting on balance it did not hinder growth or competition. In two of the three 
cases, the antitrust coefficient for employment was positive, so we can conclude that antitrust 
action more often did not impede employment growth. In two of three cases, the antitrust 
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coefficient for profit margins was positive, so we can conclude that antitrust action more often did 
not decrease profit margins, suggesting on balance its effect on prices was either negligible or 
caused via output. In two of three cases, the antitrust coefficient for revenue was negative, so we 
can conclude that antitrust action more often did not increase revenue, suggesting on balance the 
industry growth did not translate into higher sales, probably due to lower prices. 
These data suggest there is much more to the story than the study by Delorme, et al. (1997). 
They also indicate the employment claims by Shughart and Tollison (1991) do not stand up to a 
close inspection and are probably more a result of various exogenous variables or reverse 
causation. They furthermore give little credence to the efficiency concerns of Bittlingmayer 
(1985). The effects of antitrust actions are, of course, complicated and deserve further analyses 
along these lines; hopefully this paper paves the way for such research. 
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